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A COMMENT ON THE RULE OF LAW MODEL OF
SEPARATION OF POWERS
ROBERT

F. NAGEL*

President Verkuil's paper is a careful and realistic effort to consider separation of powers from the lawyers' perspective. By this I
mean that his aim is to refine rules and doctrines that can be used
to implement constitutional principles in sensible, consistent ways.
As quixotic as it may be to resist the attractions of legal thinking
when it appears in such a thoughtful and familiar form, I want to
comment on some of the negative consequences of treating the
Constitution as a legal document. My general view, which I have
expressed at some length elsewhere,1 is that lawyers' intellectual
inclinations are dangerous to constitutional values. Because the essay under consideration is such an admirable example of how we
lawyers customarily approach constitutional issues, it affords a
challenging opportunity to apply my somewhat grumpy perspective to one conception of separation of powers.
I.
Let me begin by sketching what I mean by "lawyers' intellectual
inclinations." Although. I make no effort here to explain why certain instincts and habits are common to the legal culture, I hope
that my brief description will be recognizable and plausible. First,
lawyers are not at home with plain or obvious meaning. Our job
and our skill are often to find a subtle or surprising interpretation.
Second, because so many disputes that are resolved through adjudication involve individuals, we tend to conceive of constitutional
issues in terms of rights that belong to individuals, rather than in
terms of more abstract matters like public understanding or organizational structure. Consequently, we tend to be more interested
* Moses Lasky Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law; Lee Visiting Professor, Spring 1989, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary.
1. R. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (forthcoming 1989).
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in operational rules-precise, containable, usable formulations-than in theory. Third, we have an understandable, sometimes touching, inclination to favor judicial processes and judicial
power over less familiar alternatives.
These characteristics of lawyers' thought are often appropriate
and helpful-which is why lawyers are so influential, especially in
giving effective meaning to our Constitution. However, I believe
these characteristics and that influence also help to account for the
other-worldly quality that pervades so much of modern constitutional law. The legal mind, to use only one of many available examples, has made it somehow credible, even compelling, to find in
the Constitution a whole set of rights involving a kind of behavior-sexual behavior-that without doubt is no part of the subject
matter of the Constitution's content or design. In the case of
Verkuil's argument, the legal mind makes it credible that a law
vesting in the judiciary much of the appointment and removal
power over important federal prosecutors is consistent with a principle that places the executive power in the office of the President.
Observe the foundation for this surprising conclusion: principles
of political theory are dismissed as excessively abstract and openended. Separation of powers, therefore, must be understood as a
conventional legal concept, sufficiently specific to provide a "doctrinal foothold." How is such a foothold to be found? Naturally by
analogizing separation of powers to a series of constitutional provisions, such as the bill of attainder clause and the due process
clause, that seem more workable because they involve rights that
attach to individuals and protect values that are juridical. A general organizational principle thus becomes a sort of backstop for
catching those laws that somehow get through the specific prohibitions against conflicts of interest or, more generally, against threats
to "the rule of law." A theory with strong populist antecedents-from the seventeenth century British Levellers through
America's Jeffersonian democrats 2-becomes a justification for expanding unaccountable judicial power. This rule of law model, although more in tune with the aristocratic principle of balance than
with separation, is intended to operationalize separation of powers.
If successful, the model would reduce the principle to a containa2. See M.

VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS

(1967).
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ble set of doctrines that would allow for consistent invalidation of
certain egregious laws while leaving room for legislative experimentation and growth.
Building on this foundation it is possible to conclude that the
Ethics in Government Act does not violate separation of powers.
The principal objection to this conclusion-what makes it at first
glance so startling-is that the principle of separation prohibits
the merging of the functions of different departments unless some
constitutional provision permits it,' and the Act plainly merges the
judicial and executive functions in an important way. However, a
good legal mind can immediately and justifiably dismiss the primary meaning of separation of powers as a maxim, a simplistic and
uncontainable assault on the competing constitutional principle of
balance, which often permits and sometimes requires merged functions. Although lawyers' doctrines cannot usually resolve the clash
of great organizational principles except through a naive formalism, they can (we are told) resolve the narrower conflict within the
executive branch. Indeed, if separation of powers applies mainly to
intrabranch conflicts, a powerful and immediate reason exists to
approve the Act. After all, the criminal laws that the President is
under a duty to faithfully execute are-insofar as the Ethics in
Government Act applies-aimed at executive officers themselves.
This "conflict" can be resolved by entrusting some executive power
to the judiciary. According to the rule of law model, separation of
powers is enhanced, not violated, by the merging of functions.
The obvious difficulty with this approach is that it substitutes
one kind of concern (conflict of interest within a branch) for another (the merging of functions among competing branches). According to what theory does resolving the former take precedence
over preventing the latter? Here we lawyers resort to a pragmatic
doctrine, not theory.4 Verkuil proposes 5 that the general principle
3. For some standard formulations of this view, see Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52,
127 (1926); Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 536 (1917); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,
662 (1887); Kilbourn v. Thompson 103 U.S. 168, 191 (1880).
4. I do not mean to separate myself from the tradition that I am criticizing. I once proposed a very similar doctrinal solution. Nagel, Separationof Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REv. 661, 697-706 (1978).
5. Verkuil, Separationof Powers, the Rule of Law and the Idea of Independence, 30 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 301, 327-28 (1989).
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against merging functions will not be excessively subordinated if
merger is permitted only when the objective is sufficiently important and the means chosen are the least restrictive way of achieving the purpose.6 With the exceptions to the pure principle of separation cabined by a "test" used in many other areas of
constitutional law, a sensible sort of accommodation appears to
have been struck.
All this is the kind of proficient constitutional argument that we
lawyers aspire to make. Its conventionality is demonstrated by the
Court's recent adoption of a very similar position in Morrison v.
Olson, in which the Court sustained the Ethics in Government
Act.' My doubt is that, as right as the analysis is step-by-step, it
may be wrong overall. As I said at the outset, even thoughtful legal
analysis can be dangerous. In the next section, I try to show that
Verkuil's approach leaves out or undervalues important considerations in a way that can undermine constitutional values.
II.
Resort to the rule of law model to operationalize separation of
powers submerges political theory, but does not avoid it. Consider
President Verkuil's treatment of the delegation doctrine. He notes
that when the legislature affirmatively grants some of its power to
the executive branch, normally no "conflict of interest" exists because both branches have agreed to share power. Having largely
dismissed the objection to merging functions, he next considers various other types of "conflicts," concluding that attention should
focus on "the potential for . . . biased decision-making [rather
than] on legislative abdication." 8 Many violations of separation of
powers, however, do not involve "conflicts of interest" in this
sense. By enacting the Immigration and Naturalization Act, both
the Congress and the President agreed to its one-house veto provision, and this agreement did not remove the relevant conflict.

6. In Morrison v. Olson, the Court did not employ precisely this test. It did ask, however,
whether the means were carefully designed to achieve their purpose, which (like Verkuil's
proposal) is a common doctrinal inquiry. See 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2613 (1988).
7. Id. at 2622.
8. Verkuil, supra note 5, at 321.
9. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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Similarly, the President "agreed" to share with Congress executive
power over the Comptroller General, and this agreement did not
make that merging of functions permissible. 10 When President
Truman seized the nation's steel mills, he claimed he would honor
a congressional objection," which was not forthcoming. Even in
the Steel Seizure Case, then, it is doubtful that an unequivocal
conflict of wills was a prerequisite to invalidation.
The reason why a "conflict" in this sense ought not to be a prerequisite for unconstitutionality is that the principle of separation
is based on a theory that requires differentiation of function. Consent to inappropriate merging of functions, under that theory, is
consent to an unconstitutional arrangement. On its face the theory,
wise or not, does not have to do with conflict .but with merger.
The rule of law model submerges the theory behind separation
of powers when it emphasizes a practical inquiry into bias. Of
course, there may be some aspect of the theory of separation that
permits merger of functions when both branches consent; and, of
course, there may be some constitutional theory that explains why
"biased" executive decision making is unconstitutional under either the due process clause or some residual meaning of separation
of powers. The rule of law approach to the delegation doctrine,
however, is surely incomplete without elaborating such a theory.
The substitution of practical inquiries for political theory is dangerous because judicial review is so influential in defining the relevant constitutional issues for the public. If the Supreme Court accepts as constitutional all legislative delegations except those
involving some version of executive "bias," a fundamental understanding on which our system rests is jeopardized. That understanding is best conveyed, perhaps, in the sort of maxim that is so
unsatisfactory to the modern legal mind. As Justice Black put it,
"The Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to
the Congress alone in both good and bad times."' 2 I do not claim
that maxims always make for good opinions. However, when the
judiciary defines basic constitutional principles according to the re10. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
11. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 676-77 (1952) (Vinson, C.J.,

dissenting).
12. Id. at 589.
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quirements of practical inquiry and polished opinion-writing, those
principles can be drained of their simplest and most important
meaning. At a minimum, legislators ought not to be taught that
the only constitutional considerations relevant to a delegation of
rule-making authority are their own consent and the possibility of
executive bias. Put more generally, the rule of law model offers no
intellectual resistance to the erosion of one thing we know our system depends on: widespread agreement that our legislators themselves are responsible for making the difficult choices that underlie
social regulation.
A similar set of difficulties arises when we examine the rule of
law approach to the Ethics in Government Act. As I said earlier,
that Act is thought to implement separation of powers because it
reduces the bias inherent in the President (and his Attorney General) prosecuting other members of the executive branch. Moreover, it is thought that the Act does not diminish executive authority unnecessarily, in part because the Attorney General is
permitted to remove the independent counsel for good cause, such
as incompetency. The courts are assigned the task of sorting out
whether the removal was permissible or was for the purpose of
aborting an investigation about to uncover executive wrongdoing.
The rule of law model takes it as axiomatic that something is
wrong with the kinds of tensions created when the executive
branch investigates itself. Perhaps these tensions are always unhealthy, but treating this kind of "bias" as self-evidently opposed
to "the rule of law" only submerges the necessary theoretical explanations. Suppose the worst case. If the President and his Attorney General decide to remove an independent counsel because an
investigation is threatening to uncover their own illegal conduct, it
is still not obvious that their decision is improper or that separation of powers should permit judicial control over the removal decision. No one believes that every violation of law must or should
be prosecuted. If the President's policies generally implement the
strong preferences of the electorate, he may have institutionally
sound reasons for wanting to protect his appointees from prosecution. Although some problematic theory might be used to defend a
rule that prosecution is appropriate, one cannot simply assume
that the value of democratic accountability at the most significant
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levels of government always is inferior to the value of prosecuting
specific criminal laws. 3
Focusing attention on the doctrinal question of whether the Act
is more intrusive into executive authority than necessary substitutes a practical inquiry for important theoretical questions. Again,
this model can be dangerous for the maintenance of elementary
aspects of the constitutional design. Putting aside notions of institutional bias for a moment, one avenue for correcting abuses under
our constitutional system is quite clear. When the people determine that lawlessness in the executive branch is sufficiently serious, they can get redress by voting the President out of office or by
14
removing him in accordance with the impeachment provisions.
For these constitutional remedies to work, however, the people
must accept their responsibilities and must be ready to use their
power. Basic aspects of the constitutional system depend on intangibles-on attitudes, sentiments, understandings, and psychological predispositions-despite the fact that concern for intangible
conditions is foreign to the kind of pragmatic operationalism that
dominates modern legal thought. The rule of law model has already seriously eroded the public's readiness to oversee the Presidency by short-circuiting a conscientious impeachment investigation of a sitting President. 15 The Ethics in Government Act
institutionalizes a similar transfer of power and responsibility from
the political branches to the courts. Under the Act neither the
President, the Congress, nor the people need to weigh the importance of individual prosecutions against the achievement of preferred public policies or other relevant considerations. 16 This crucial judgment is now to be made by an independent officer subject
to judicial oversight. As I said a moment ago with respect to the
delegation doctrine, the rule of law model offers no intellectual resistance to the erosion of one thing on which we know our system

13. For an analogous situation in which the Court gave priority to voters' preferences, see
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
14. See Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2638-39 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
15. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). See Gunther, Judicial Hegemony and
Legislative Autonomy: The Nixon Case and the Impeachment Process, 22 UCLA L. REv. 30
(1974).
16. For enumerations of some of these considerations, see Morrison,108 S. Ct. at 2628-29,
2638-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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depends: widespread agreement that it is the responsibility of the
public itself (and its elected officials) to decide when executive lawlessness is intolerable.
III.
In his dissent in Morrison v. Olson, Justice Scalia characterized
the majority opinion as lawless:
Worse than what it has done, however, is the manner in which
it has done it. A government of laws means a government of
rules. Today's decision on the basic issue of fragmentation of
executive power is ungoverned by rule, and hence ungoverned
by law.... Taking all things into account, we conclude that the
power taken away from the President 17here is not really too
much.... This is .. . ad hoc judgment.
Against the allegedly lawless balancing of the majority, Justice
Scalia proposed a straightforward textualism. The issues, he said
repeatedly, are "clear" and "plain."'" The case should be resolved
by reference to the simple principle announced in article II: "The
executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States.' 9
There is an innocence about this conception of lawfulness. After
all, the Morrison opinion is not, despite Scalia's outraged attack,
especially unusual. As President Verkuil's paper illustrates, realistic functionalism is usually praised as a sophisticated alternative to
simplistic maxims and other crude manifestations of literalism. Although the majority opinion is somewhat opaque in its reliance on
matters of degree, its basic approach is surely consistent with modern understandings of both law and adjudication. Indeed, in going
beyond the apparent clarity of the text, the Court engaged in the
17. Id. at 2640-41.
18. Id. at 2625 (suggesting that to describe the case is to decide it), 2626 (reducing the
issue to whether statute deprives President of exclusive control over executive authority),
2628 (arguing that it is not for the Court to decide how much purely executive power must
be kept in the office of the President), 2629 (referring to the "clear" constitutional standard), 2632 (relying on "common usage"), 2633 (relying on dictionary meaning), 2634
(describing historical intent as "clear"), 2635 (claiming "there is no doubt about [the fact
that the independent prosecutor is not subordinate to President]"), 2641 (describing the
relevant constitutional principle as quite plain).
19. Id. at 2641 (quoting U.S. CoNsT. art. II).
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kind of creative analysis taught in every law school. If Morrison is
lawless, much of modern constitutional law is lawless, for it is entirely normal for the courts to balance, to qualify, to distinguish,
and to complicate.
Although Justice Scalia's obstinate insistence on simplicity runs
against the current, his approach has its own claim to sophistication. Because constitutionalism involves the preservation of basic
institutions, it depends on public understanding and support. I believe that the creative balancing engaged in by the majority opinion is fundamentally antithetical to the kinds of stable assumptions, instincts, and beliefs that undergird the system. Under this
view, however, the deficiency in Morrison is not its lawlessness.
The deficiency is that its lawfulness-its recognizably sophisticated, legalistic quality-is unsuited to the task of preserving constitutional arrangements.
If "lawfulness" can undermine constitutionalism, judicial decisions that are good for the constitutional system may not be admirable under traditional legal norms. Useful opinions, like that of
Justice Black in the Steel Seizure Case,20 sometimes have to convey difficult political theories in simplified terms. Moreover, because fidelity to constitutional principles requires not only public
understanding but also public support, there are severe limitations
on how consistently courts can apply even their useful holdings.
Doctrinaire enforcement of the theory of separation of powers
might eventually undermine popular acceptance of the principle,
much as pre-1937 enforcement of federalism reduced acceptance of
that principle. Indeed, from the perspective of support for constitutional values in the wider political community, the strongest aspect of Morrison is not its legalistic craft, but its possible political
acumen. If separation of powers became linked in the public perception with protecting criminal scheming in the executive branch,
another constitutional value (along with separation of church and
state, free speech, and the right against self-incrimination) would
appear unwise to important segments of the public. Similarly, although the invalidation of the legislative veto may have taught a
useful and simple lesson about the mechanics of legislating, the

20. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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consistent extension of INS v. Chadha2 ' could be constitutionally
harmful if the bureaucratic state were thereby made significantly
less accountable. An intellectually rigorous application of Justice
Scalia's disapproval of the Ethics in Government Act might (despite his disclaimers) threaten the Court's approval of independent
administrative agencies in Humphrey's Executor v. United
States.22 If so, even his useful insistence on a basic, simple principle might discredit separation of powers in the long run by
preventing necessary administrative adaptations. In this event,
Scalia's position could be kept useful to constitutionalism only by
abandonment of the legalistic criterion of consistency
My main point, however, is not that opinions of doubtful legal
quality can be constitutionally useful. The important point is that
good legal thinking can be constitutionally dysfunctional. If we
lawyers insist that our habits and standards should constrain how
the Constitution is to be understood, we should face up to how our
intellectual norms may be destructive to constitutional values. If
the development of pragmatic doctrine helps us lose sight of our
Constitution's basic design-under which the Congress should be
held accountable for making the laws and the President for executing them-sophistication will have helped do us in.

21. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
22. 295 U.S. 602 (1935). Justice Scalia adhered to the position that "the line of permissible restriction upon removal of principal officers lies at the point at which the powers exercised
are no longer purely executive." 108 S. Ct. at 2636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Yet he
also described the category of" 'purely executive' functions" as unclear and irrational. Id.
Given this concession and Scalia's emphatic view that is not for the courts to determine how
much purely executive power must be preserved for the President, one can certainly conclude from his opinion that all "independent" agencies ought to be found unconstitutional.

